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CASE NOTE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—Deliberating in the Open? Applying Wyoming’s
Public Meetings Act to Contested Case Hearings; Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo.
Med. Comm’n (Decker II), 191 P.3d 105 (Wyo. 2008)
Justin Newell Hesser*

INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division denied Daniel
Decker’s claim for beneﬁts.1 The division referred Decker’s claim to the Medical
Commission (Commission), which established a hearing panel (Panel) to hold
a contested case hearing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
(WAPA).2 The Panel upheld the denial and Decker appealed.3
The Wyoming Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Panel.4 Citing
the Wyoming Public Meetings Act (PMA), Decker ﬁled a motion on remand with
the Commission seeking to observe the Panel deliberations.5 The Commission
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. I would like to thank Professor Michael
Duff and Robert M. Brenner for their comments and advice. Also, thanks to my wife and mother
for their continued support and endless feedback.
Editor’s Note: As this issue was going to press, on January 8, 2010, the Wyoming Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Building Code Board of Appeals, 2010 WY
2 (2010), discussed infra notes 29, 63, 177. The court held that quasi-judicial deliberations following
a contested case hearing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act are subject to the Wyoming
Public Meetings Act. However, the court held that the agency’s action was not null and void because the
agency’s ultimate action took place at a public meeting. The special concurrence and the dissenting opinion
illustrate the continuing signiﬁcance of the issues discussed by this note.
1
Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker II), 191 P.3d 105, 107 (Wyo. 2008).
Decker claimed his employment with Mountain Aire Heating and Air materially aggravated his
preexisting condition of thoracic outlet syndrome. Id. at 107–08.
2
Id. at 107. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act is located at Wyoming Statutes
§§ 16-3-101 to -115. This case note will refer to the Medical Commission and the hearing panel as
separate bodies. The Medical Commission is made up of at least eleven health care providers who
are appointed by the governor and serve as members. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-616(a)–(b) (2009).
One of the Commission’s duties is to provide three members to serve as a hearing panel for contested
cases referred to the Commission. § 27-14-616(b)(iv).
3
Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker I), 124 P.3d 686, 688 (Wyo. 2005).
Appeals from an administrative agency are ﬁrst taken to the district court. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3114. A district court’s ﬁnal judgment can then be reviewed by the Wyoming Supreme Court. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 16-3-115. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court gives the district court’s decision
no deference and instead reviews the case as if it came directly from the agency. McIntosh v. State ex
rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n, 162 P.3d 483, 487 (Wyo. 2007). The district court afﬁrmed the denial of
Decker’s beneﬁts. Decker I, 124 P.3d at 688.
4

Decker I, 124 P.3d at 697.

5

Transcript of Record vol. II at 500–01, Decker II, 191 P.3d 105 (S-07-0051) [hereinafter
Decker Motion]. While Decker was seeking to attend the hearing panel’s deliberations, his motion
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denied Decker’s motion, and the hearing panel entered a supplemental order
upholding the denial of beneﬁts.6 Decker again appealed.7
The Wyoming Supreme Court held the hearing panel was not subject to
the provisions of the PMA, and therefore was not required to allow parties or
the public to attend deliberations following a contested case hearing.8 While the
court found the Panel followed proper procedures, it ultimately held substantial
evidence did not support the order and reversed on that basis.9
This case note examines the Wyoming PMA and how it applies to quasijudicial bodies, particularly when they deliberate following contested case
hearings.10 First, this note will examine the policies and purposes behind open
meeting acts in general and the Wyoming PMA speciﬁcally.11 This discussion
will also examine the nature of quasi-judicial bodies and how open meeting laws
apply to them.12 Next, this case note will explain how the majority relied on
alternative rationales to reach its holding in Decker II, and discuss the dissent’s
argument.13 Furthermore, this note will argue that while the majority was correct
in its conclusion, it erred by ﬁnding the hearing panel was not a body subject
to the PMA—instead the court should have determined that, while the Panel is
subject to the act, its deliberations are not.14 Finally, this note will conclude the
court should continue to hold the PMA does not cover quasi-judicial deliberations
following contested case hearings, given the purpose and policies of the act.15

was ﬁled with the Ofﬁce of the Medical Commission. Id. The Wyoming Public Meetings Act is
located at Wyoming Statutes §§ 16-4-401 to -408. Decker’s motion argued the PMA would allow
his attendance because the Panel was an agency and its deliberations were a meeting and action
under Wyoming Statute § 16-4-402(a). Decker Motion, supra. Even though Decker cited the
PMA as authority, his argument to the Wyoming Supreme Court stated he did not believe the
deliberations should be open to the entire public. Brief of Appellant at 25, Decker II, 191 P.3d 105
(S-07-0051) [hereinafter Decker II Appellant’s Brief ].
6
Decker II, 191 P.3d at 112; Transcript of Record vol. II at 526–36, Decker II, 191 P.3d 105
(S-07-0051) [hereinafter Commission’s Decision].
7
Decker II, 191 P.3d at 108. The district court afﬁrmed the Panel’s decision and Decker
continued his appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court. Id. at 113.
8

Id. at 118.

9

Id. at 122. This case note focuses on the issue Decker raised regarding the right to attend
the Panel’s deliberations; therefore the court’s discussion of the substantial evidence standard is
outside the scope of this note.
10

See infra notes 113–94 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 16–43 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 44–78 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 79–107 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 120–74 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 175–94 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
The press began to lobby legislatures to pass open meeting statutes in the
1950s, because many press organizations thought state and local governments
conducted too much business behind closed doors.16 The public has no common
law right to attend meetings of governmental bodies, and the U.S. Constitution
does not guarantee the right to attend public meetings; therefore open meeting
laws are necessary to ensure an open government.17 There are many purposes and
beneﬁts of open meeting laws: they are essential to the democratic process by
providing information to the citizens, creating a public forum to discuss issues,
serving as a check on those elected, guarding against corruption, and allowing
taxpayers to see how their money is spent.18 On the other hand, critics of open
meeting laws often argue there are times when decision-makers should be free from
public pressure.19 Critics also argue open meeting laws prematurely disclose some
information, produce unintended consequences, and discourage debate among
politicians who may elect to stay silent because they fear appearing ignorant.20
Despite the objections some have, open meeting laws exist in all ﬁfty states.21
Open meeting laws typically contain the following types of provisions:
(1) deﬁnitions that determine what bodies the act applies to and its scope, (2)
general procedural requirements, (3) exemptions, and (4) provisions prescribing

Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199,
1199 (1962) [hereinafter The Press Fights]. These types of statutes have many names, including open
meeting, right to know, public meeting, and sunshine laws. ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, OPEN MEETING
LAWS 3 (2d ed. 2000). For the purpose of this note they will be referred to as open meeting laws.
16

17
Charles N. Davis, Milagros Rivera-Sanchez & Bill F. Chamberlin, Sunshine Laws and
Judicial Discretion: A Proposal for Reform of State Sunshine Law Enforcement Provisions, 28 URB. LAW.
41, 41 (1996).
18
The Press Fights, supra note 16, at 1200–01; Sandra F. Chance & Christina Locke, The
Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: A Model for Implementing New Technologies
Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245,
245–46 (2008); Davis, Rivera-Sanchez & Chamberlin, supra note 17, at 43; Teresa Dale Pupillo,
The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State
Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1165, 1166 (1993).
19
The Press Fights, supra note 16, at 1202. The often-cited example is the Constitutional
Convention in which the delegates met in secret. Id. However, it is noted the Federalist Papers were
necessary to gain the public’s acceptance of the Constitution because the Convention was closed to
the public. Id. at 1202 n.18; Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1167 n.13. Also, despite the closure of the
Convention, the Founding Fathers did argue for open meetings. Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1167
n.12.
20
The Press Fights, supra note 16, at 1202; Chance & Locke, supra note 18, at 246; Davis,
Rivera-Sanchez & Chamberlin, supra note 17, at 43.
21
Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1165. The last state to adopt such a statute was New York in
1976. Id. at 1165 n.1.
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remedies and penalties.22 While the purpose of open meeting laws is often clearly
stated, application of the laws can be difﬁcult because they are vague.23
The Wyoming legislature passed the PMA in 1973.24 The legislature adopted
a statement of purpose declaring, “[A]gencies of Wyoming exist to conduct public
business. Certain deliberations and actions shall be taken openly as provided in
this act.”25 The PMA does not specify bodies or activities it applies to, but instead
provides deﬁnitions of action, agency, and meeting.26 The general requirement
under the PMA is “[a]ll meetings of the governing body of an agency are public
meetings, open to the public at all times, except as otherwise provided.”27 While
the legislature and judiciary are exempt from coverage, the only other exemptions

22

Id. at 1168.

23

Id. at 1175.

24

1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 192–94. The PMA was partially based on the California and Florida
open meeting statutes passed in previous years. 1973 Op. Wyo. Att’y Gen. No. 17, 51 (Aug. 3,
1973). However, those states more actively amended the statutes since enactment, and a comparison
is no longer beneﬁcial. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-401 to -408 (2009), with CAL. GOV’T
CODE §§ 11120–32 (West 2009) (covering public meetings of state bodies), CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 54950–63 (West 2009) (covering public meetings of local bodies), and FLA. STAT. § 286.011
(2009).
25
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-401. The original statement of purpose adopted in 1973 stated,
“[v]arious agencies of Wyoming exist to conduct public business.” 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 192
(emphasis added). But the legislature eliminated the word “various” in 1982. 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws
376. That has been the only change made to this section. See id.
26

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402. This statute states:
(a) As used in this act:
(i)

“Action” means the transaction of ofﬁcial business of an agency including
a collective decision of a governing body, a collective commitment or
promise by a governing body to make a positive or negative decision, or
an actual vote by a governing body upon a motion, proposal, resolution,
regulation, rule, order or ordinance;

(ii) “Agency” means any authority, bureau, board, commission, committee,
or subagency of the state, a county, a municipality or other political
subdivision which is created by or pursuant to the Wyoming
constitution, statute or ordinance, other than the state legislature and
the judiciary;
(iii) “Meeting” means an assembly of at least a quorum of the governing
body of an agency which has been called by proper authority of the
agency for the purpose of discussion, deliberation, presentation of
information or taking action regarding public business.
Id.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-403. This statute continues to provide, “No action of a governing
body of an agency shall be taken except during a public meeting following notice of the meeting in
accordance with this act. Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with this act is null and void
and not merely voidable.” Id.
27
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relate to executive sessions.28 The PMA also provides that its provisions control if
there is any conﬂict with other statutes.29 The Wyoming legislature amended the
PMA three times since its adoption.30 The most substantive amendment occurred
in 1995 when the deﬁnition of “meeting” was changed to include deliberations.31
In 2005 the legislature added a penalty provision.32
In 1977, the Wyoming Supreme Court ﬁrst mentioned the PMA and
declared “state agencies must act in a ﬁshbowl” unless their actions fall within
an exemption.33 In a later case addressing public records, the court summarized
its position toward openness, declaring “courts, [the] legislature, administrative
agencies, and the state, county and municipal governments should be ever mindful
that theirs is public business and the public has a right to know how its servants
are conducting its business.”34 Despite pronouncements about the public’s right
to know, the Wyoming Supreme Court has never held a public body’s action void
for violating the PMA.35
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-402(a)(ii), 16-4-405. While a public body can meet in executive
session, the body must still have a motion to do so, and minutes must be kept. WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-4-405(b)–(c).
28

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-407. This statute has been used to argue the PMA provisions
control over other provisions. See Brief of Appellant at 28, Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Building
Code Bd. of Appeals (Cheyenne Newspapers PMA Case) (S-09-0103) [hereinafter Cheyenne
Newspapers PMA Case Appellant’s Brief ]; see Editor’s Note supra p. 203. However, at least one party
has argued provisions of the open meeting laws are repealed by implication if a speciﬁc provision is
adopted after the open meeting laws. See Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.
1990). Wyoming Statute § 16-4-407 was last amended in 1982. 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws 378. Statutes
relating to contested case proceedings in workers’ compensation cases were ﬁrst adopted in 1986.
1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 35–41 (Special Session). Implication by repeal is not favored, and a party
must demonstrate “beyond question that the legislature intended that its later legislative action
evinced an unequivocal purpose of affecting a repeal.” Mathewson v. City of Cheyenne, 61 P.3d
1229, 1233 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Shumway v. Worthey, 37 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2001)). A party
must also show that the later statute “is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot logically
stand together.” Id.
29

30

2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws 494–95; 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 207–08; 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws

376–78.
31
1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 208. The previous deﬁnition of meeting stated: “‘Meeting’ means an
assembly of the governing body of an agency at which action is taken.” Id.
32
2005 Wyo. Sess. Laws 494. This amendment created Wyoming Statute § 16-4-408, which
provides that any member of an agency who “knowingly and willfully” violates the act is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Id.
33
Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 567 P.2d 731, 734 (Wyo. 1977). The issue
in that case involved whether a transcript of a public meeting was subject to disclosure under the
Public Records Act. Id. at 732. The court did not have to decide if the meeting was subject to the
PMA, but did address generally the state’s “disclosure acts.” Id. at 734.
34

Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 791 (Wyo. 1983).

35

See Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 923 (Wyo. 2007) (holding members of a Board of
County Commissioners did not violate the PMA when they met in their capacity as trustees of the
Scenic Preservation Trust); Mayland v. Flitner, 28 P.3d 838, 849 (Wyo. 2001) (holding no action
was taken by County Commissioners when they instructed a county attorney to prepare ﬁndings of
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has addressed whether deliberative meetings
prior to decisions are in violation of the PMA.36 The most recent of these cases
is Mayland v. Flitner, which occurred after substantive amendments to the
PMA were made in 1995.37 The plaintiffs in Mayland alleged a board of county
commissioners violated the PMA by meeting in private to discuss a private road
application.38 The court accepted previous holdings that allowed agencies to gather
for informal meetings prior to making a decision and held the commissioners did
not perform any action that could be void.39
The only time the court has addressed deliberations with reference to quasijudicial bodies was in a case prior to adoption of the PMA—when the court
considered a claim that a district boundary board met behind closed doors.40 The
plaintiffs in that case complained the board met in private to make a decision and
then later announced that decision to the public.41 The court stated due to the
nature of quasi-judicial boards and agencies, they were required to hold hearings
in the open, even though no statute then required it.42 However, the court noted
the right to attend and present evidence at the meeting did not prohibit such
boards from planning and deliberating in private sessions.43

fact and conclusions of law prior to the Commissioners’ decision); Deering v. Bd. of Dirs. of County
Library, 954 P.2d 1359, 1364–65 (Wyo. 1998) (holding no violation of the PMA occurred because
the alleged improper meeting was a rescheduled regular meeting and not a special meeting); Ward
v. Bd. of Trs. of Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (holding there
was not sufﬁcient evidence to ﬁnd a school board made a “collective decision” in a closed meeting);
Emery v. City of Rawlins, 596 P.2d 675, 680 (Wyo. 1979) (holding no action resulted from a
“preliminary gathering” of city council members and therefore no violation of PMA occurred); see
also Fontaine v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 4 P.3d 890, 891 (Wyo. 2000) (holding no violation of
PMA occurred, but a County Clerk is required to attend executive sessions and take minutes).
36
Mayland, 28 P.3d at 849; Ward, 865 P.2d at 621–22; Emery, 596 P.2d at 680; see also Sch.
Dist. No. 9 v. Dist. Boundary Bd., 351 P.2d 106, 110 (Wyo. 1960).
37

28 P.3d at 841; see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the 1995 amendments).

38

Mayland, 28 P.3d at 848.

39

Id. at 849 (citing Ward, 865 P.2d at 621; Emery, 596 P.2d at 679).

40

Sch. Dist. No. 9, 351 P.2d at 110. A district boundary board establishes and has the power
to alter school district boundaries. Id. at 108 n.1.
41

Id. at 108.

42

Id. at 110.

43

Id.
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Character of Quasi-Judicial Agencies
The two main functions of administrative agencies are adjudication and
rulemaking.44 A single agency often performs both of these functions.45 When an
agency performs an adjudication it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, determining
an individual’s rights or duties.46 In contrast, when an agency performs rulemaking
it acts in a quasi-legislative capacity, adopting regulations which reﬂect general
policy.47 A quasi-judicial activity must possess certain characteristics.48 These
characteristics include investigating a claim, weighing evidence, applying
preexisting standards to the controversy, and making binding decisions.49 While
quasi-judicial agencies do not technically hold judicial proceedings, the courts
performed many of the agencies’ functions prior to their existence.50
In Wyoming, an administrative agency acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when
it performs a contested case proceeding.51 A contested case requires a right to
a hearing, and such a right may exist by statute, by agency rule, or because it
is necessary to satisfy due process requirements.52 The Workers’ Compensation
Division is among the Wyoming agencies that provide for contested case
hearings.53 Originally, workers’ compensation hearings were handled exclusively

44
E.g., CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.11 (2d ed. Supp. 2009);
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 1 (2009) [hereinafter C.J.S. Administrative
Law]. Each of these functions can be conducted in either a formal or informal manner. KOCH, supra,
§ 2.10.

C.J.S. Administrative Law, supra note 44, § 1; 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 48
(2009) [hereinafter AM. JUR. Administrative Law].
45

46

KOCH, supra note 44, § 2.11; C.J.S. Administrative Law, supra note 44, § 16.

47

KOCH, supra note 44, § 2.11; C.J.S. Administrative Law, supra note 44, § 17.

KOCH, supra note 44, § 2.11; AM. JUR. Administrative Law, supra note 45, § 28; C.J.S.
Administrative Law, supra note 44, § 16.
48

KOCH, supra note 44, § 2.11; AM. JUR. Administrative Law, supra note 45, § 28; C.J.S.
Administrative Law, supra note 44, § 16.
49

50

C.J.S. Administrative Law, supra note 44, § 16.

51

Nancy D. Freudenthal & Roger C. Fransen, Administrative Law: Rulemaking and Contested
Case Practice in Wyoming, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 685, 698 (1996). A contested case is deﬁned
as a proceeding “in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-101(b)(ii)
(2009).
52

Freudenthal & Fransen, supra note 51, at 698–99. The WAPA does not create the right to
have a contested case, and instead provides the procedure to be followed in a contested case. Id. at
699.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-601(k)(iv) (2009). A worker is entitled to request a hearing
regarding his or her claim after the Workers’ Compensation Division has made a ﬁnal determination.
Id.
53
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by the district courts.54 Beginning in 1986, workers’ compensation cases were
heard exclusively by hearing examiners.55 In 1993, the legislature created the
Medical Commission, which provides an additional venue to hear workers’
compensation cases which are “medically contested.”56
A medically contested case has been deﬁned as “one in which the primary
issue requires the application of a medical judgment to complex medical facts
or conﬂicting diagnoses.”57 Medically contested cases must be referred to the
Commission.58 Once a worker requests a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation
Division refers contested cases to either the Ofﬁce of Administrative Hearings
or the Commission based on issues in the case.59 Upon referral, the Commission
establishes a hearing panel to decide each medically contested case.60

54
George Santini, The Breaking of a Compromise: An Analysis of Wyoming Worker’s
Compensation Legislation, 1986-1997, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 489, 500 (1998). Under this
system, deliberations of district court judges would have been conducted in private, because the
PMA has always exempted the judiciary. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402 (1973).
55

Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker II), 191 P.3d 105, 115 (Wyo. 2008);
1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws 36 (Special Session). This process was formalized in 1992 when the legislature
created the Ofﬁce of Administrative Hearings. Santini, supra note 54, at 505.
56
Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker I), 124 P.3d 686, 694 (Wyo. 2005);
Santini, supra note 54, at 507. The Medical Commission is created pursuant to Wyoming Statute
§ 27-14-616. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the commission and hearing panel.
57
McIntosh v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n, 162 P.3d 483, 492 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting
French v. Amax Coal W., 960 P.2d 1023, 1030 (Wyo. 1998)); accord 025-220-006 WYO. CODE R.
§ 1 (Weil 2008).
58
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-616(b)(iv) (2009); McIntosh, 162 P.3d at 491; 025-220-006
WYO. CODE R. § 1.
59
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-616(b)(iv); 025-220-006 WYO. CODE R. § 1. The Division’s
decision regarding where to refer a contested case is not subject to administrative review. WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 27-14-616(b)(iv). A hearing panel can also receive a case from the Ofﬁce of Administrative
Hearings if there is a medically contested issue and all parties agree to the transfer. § 27-14-616(e);
025-240-003 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (Weil 2008). A hearing panel can also provide advice to the OAH
hearing examiner on speciﬁed medical issues. 025-240-003 WYO. CODE R. § 2.
60
025-240-006 WYO. CODE R. § 1 (Weil 2008) (providing the selection process for establishing
hearing panels). The Commission can establish different Panels to hear cases, or the same panel can
hear multiple cases. Id. When possible, commission members are assigned to cases based on their
expertise relevant to medical issues in the case. Id. A presiding ofﬁcer is designated and has “all
powers necessary to conduct a fair and impartial hearing.” 025-240-006 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (Weil
2008). The Panel has “exclusive jurisdiction to make the ﬁnal administrative determination of the
validity and amount of compensation payable under” the Workers’ Compensation Act. WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 27-14-616(b)(iv). The Panel’s hearing procedure includes the opportunity for opening and
closing statements, presentation of evidence, and written arguments when appropriate. 025-240009 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (Weil 2008). The Panel must enter a written ﬁnal decision which contains
ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law. 025-240-010 WYO. CODE R. § 3 (Weil 2008).
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Quasi-Judicial Agencies as Being Covered by Open Meeting Laws
The majority of states have addressed the issue of whether quasi-judicial
bodies are covered by open meeting laws, but they reach varying conclusions
depending on multiple factors.61 The states can be classiﬁed into three main
groups: (1) states that address the issue by statute, (2) states that address the issue
in case law interpreting statutes, and (3) states that have not addressed the issue.62
The Wyoming PMA does not address the issue, and prior to Decker II, Wyoming
was among the group of states that had not addressed the issue.63
Among states that address the issue by statute, a majority exempt quasijudicial agencies in at least some form.64 Some of these state statutes broadly
exempt all quasi-judicial agencies with no qualiﬁcations.65 Other statutes exempt
only state quasi-judicial bodies, and still require local quasi-judicial bodies to hold
deliberations in the open.66 Another group of states have statutes that allow quasijudicial bodies to deliberate in closed session, but still require the body to follow
61
SCHWING, supra note 16, at 122–28 (discussing how states do not treat quasi-judicial bodies
uniformly and stating the result depends on a variety of factors).
62

See id.

See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-401 to -408 (2006). The premise of this note is that Decker
II did not clearly decide the issue because it relied on alternative rationales. See infra note 177 and
accompanying text. However, it can be argued Decker II stands for the proposition that quasi-judicial
deliberations are not subject to the PMA. See Brief of Appellee at 5, 11, Cheyenne Newspapers PMA
Case, (S-09-0103) [hereinafter Cheyenne Newspapers PMA Case Appellee’s Brief ] (relying on Decker
II for proposition that quasi-judicial deliberations do not need to be conducted in public). But
see Cheyenne Newspapers PMA Case Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 21–22 (arguing the court’s
analysis in Decker II applies only to the Panel). See infra note 177 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Cheyenne Newspapers PMA Case. See also Editor’s Note supra p. 203.
63

64

See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.

See ALA. CODE § 36-25A-7(a)(9) (2009) (stating a quasi-judicial body is allowed to
“deliberate and discuss evidence or testimony presented during a public or contested case hearing”
as long as the body either votes on the decision in a public meeting or issues a written decision
which may be appealed); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(1) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(g)(1)
(2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.810(1)(j) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.18(7)
(West 2009) (exempting public bodies subject to the State Budget Act that perform “quasi-judicial
functions, during a meeting or session held solely for the purpose of making a decision in an
adjudicatory action or proceeding”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(e)–(f ) (2009); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.30.140(2) (West 2009) (“[T]his chapter shall not apply to . . . [t]hat portion of a
meeting of a quasi-judicial body which relates to a quasi-judicial matter between named parties as
distinguished from a matter having general effect on the public or on a class or group . . . .”); W. VA.
CODE § 6-9A-2(4)(A) (2009) (“[M]eeting does not include . . . [a]ny meeting for the purpose of
making an adjudicatory decision in any quasi-judicial, administrative or court of claims proceeding
. . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.85 (West 2009) (stating a closed session may be held to deliberate a
case subject to a quasi-judicial trial or hearing).
65

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West 2009) (exempting quasi-judicial bodies
from the state open meeting law); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 34, § 9F (West 2009) (providing no
exemptions for quasi-judicial bodies from the county open meeting law); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 39, § 23A (West 2009) (providing no exemptions for quasi-judicial bodies from the municipal
open meeting law); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.690 (West 2009).
66
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certain procedures and make a ﬁnal decision in the open.67 A smaller group of
states list speciﬁc quasi-judicial bodies that are exempt.68 A few statutes generally
exempt all quasi-judicial bodies, but then list certain quasi-judicial bodies the
act applies to.69 Finally, a minority of state open meeting statutes explicitly cover
quasi-judicial agencies.70
When state courts interpret open meeting laws to determine if quasi-judicial
bodies are subject to the laws, they reach different results.71 First, some courts
hold quasi-judicial bodies and their deliberations are subject to open meeting
statutes.72 Second, some courts hold deliberations by quasi-judicial bodies are
not subject to open meeting statutes; and these courts give varying rationales.73
One approach is for courts to rely on policy and “practical application” of the
laws to hold that quasi-judicial deliberations are not subject to open meeting

See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11126(c)(3) (West 2009); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/2(c)(4),
120/2a (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.5(1)(f ) (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1(H)
(3), (I) (West 2009) (exempting “deliberations by a public body in connection with an administrative
adjudicatory proceeding”); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 708(a)(5) (West 2009).
67

68
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-2342 (2009) (allowing closed deliberations by the board
of tax appeals, public utilities commission and industrial commission following an adjudicatory
proceeding); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.263(7) (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13D.01 (West
2009) (providing the open meeting law does not apply “to a state agency, board, or commission
when it is exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings”); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 25-41-3(a)(vi), (x) (West 2009) (exempting the Workers’ Compensation Commission and State
Tax Commission when it holds hearings).

See HAW. REV. STAT. § 92-6(a)(2), (b) (2009) (exempting “adjudicatory functions,” but
requiring the land use commission to deliberate in the open); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T
§ 10-503 (West 2009) (exempting a public body which performs a quasi-judicial function, but
requiring public bodies which grant licenses or permits, or consider zoning matters to comply with
the open meeting law); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108(1) (McKinney 2009) (“Nothing contained in
this article shall be construed as extending the provisions hereof to . . . judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, except proceedings of the public service commission and zoning boards of appeals . . . .”).
70
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 (2009) (stating a “[p]ublic body includes all quasijudicial bodies,” and deﬁning quasi-judicial body as “a public body, other than a court of law,
possessing the power to hold hearings on disputed matters between a private person and a public
agency and to make decisions in the general manner of a court regarding such disputed claims”);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.010(4)(d) (West 2009) (stating that “[p]ublic governmental body” includes
any “administrative governmental deliberative body under the direction of three or more elected
or appointed members having rulemaking or quasi-judicial power”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 551.001(3)(D) (Vernon 2009) (stating “[g]overnmental body” includes “a deliberative body that
has rulemaking or quasi-judicial power”).
69

71

See infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.

72

See Lanes v. State Auditor’s Ofﬁce, 797 P.2d 764, 766 (Colo. App. 1990) (holding a board
which acts in a quasi-judicial manner does not “negate its obligation” under the open meeting
law); Canney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1973); Bryan County Bd. of
Equalization v. Bryan County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 560 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002);
Citizens Action Coal. of Ind. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 425 N.E.2d 178, 183–84 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981); Remington v. City of Boonville, 701 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
73

See SCHWING, supra note 16, at 122–28; see also infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/9

10

Hesser: Administrative Law - Deliberating in the Open: Applying Wyoming's

CASE NOTE

2010

213

laws.74 Another approach is for courts to ﬁnd that quasi-judicial bodies are part
of the judiciary and therefore exempt.75 An Oklahoma court expressed a ﬁnal
approach when it relied on the Oklahoma Administrative Procedure Act to hold
a ﬁnal decision by a quasi-judicial body does not need to be reached in an open
meeting.76
Finally, the remaining states have open meeting laws that do not address
whether quasi-judicial bodies are covered, and the issue has not been raised to
the appellate courts.77 In some of these states, attorney general opinions provide
guidance.78

PRINCIPAL CASE
After the Workers’ Compensation Division denied Decker’s claim for beneﬁts,
his case was referred to the Medical Commission, which established a hearing
panel to decide whether his claimed injury was compensable.79 The Panel denied
Decker’s claim for beneﬁts.80 In Decker’s ﬁrst appeal, the Wyoming Supreme
Court concluded the hearing panel’s ﬁndings of fact failed to provide the court
with a rational basis for judicial review and remanded.81

74

Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 598 P.2d 1312, 1315–16 (Utah
1979); accord Angerman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 591 N.E.2d 3, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
75

See McQuinn v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. No. 66, 612 N.W.2d 198, 206–07 (Neb.
2000) (construing an exemption of judicial proceedings to apply when a body “decides a dispute
of adjudicative fact”); Stockmeier v. Nev. Dept. of Corr. Psychological Review Panel, 135 P.3d 220,
223 (Nev. 2006); Roberts II v. City of Cranston Zoning Bd. of Review, 448 A.2d 779, 781 (R.I.
1982).
76

Stillwater Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Okla. Savings & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9, 11 (Okla.

1975).
77
See SCHWING, supra note 16, at 122–28 (citing statutes and cases from states which have
addressed the issue); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -110 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1-200 to -205a, 225 to -243 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001–10006 (2009); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:4.1 to 4.13 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401–412 (2009); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 2-3-201 to -221 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:1–9 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:4-6 to -4-21 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-17.1 to -22 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 30-4-10 to -110 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-25-1 to -9 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44101 to -106 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 to -3714 (West 2009).
78
E.g., 42 MONT. OP. ATT’Y GEN. 239 (1988) (determining county tax appeal board could
not close its deliberations based on the fact it was a quasi-judicial body); ARK. OP. ATT’Y GEN. No.
97-080 (1997) (stating that “generally” deliberations of quasi-judicial bodies must be open).
79

Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker I), 124 P.3d 686, 698 (Wyo. 2005).

80

Id. at 688.

81

Id. at 697. The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded the Panel did not explain how it
weighed conﬂicting medical opinions and appeared to be independently diagnosing Decker. Id.
at 694. The court stated an independent diagnosis would be contrary to the WAPA and without a
weighing of the evidence there was no basis to determine the reasonableness of the Panel’s decision.
Id. at 697.
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On remand, Decker ﬁled a motion with the Commission seeking to
present additional arguments and to observe the Panel deliberations.82 Decker
cited the PMA as authority for allowing him to observe the deliberations.83 The
Commission denied both aspects of Decker’s appeal.84 The Commission ﬁrst
concluded the hearing panel functions as a quasi-judicial body, which is allowed
private deliberations.85 The Commission then determined no provisions of the
WAPA required deliberations to be open, and the PMA did not apply to the Panel
because it was not an “agency,” “quorum of the governing body,” nor holding a
“meeting.”86
After the Commission denied Decker’s motion, the hearing panel entered a
supplemental order denying Decker’s claim for beneﬁts.87 Decker again appealed
and presented two issues for review: ﬁrst, whether substantial evidence supported
the hearing panel’s supplemental order or if it was arbitrary and capricious; and
second, whether the Commission’s decision denied Decker’s due process rights
because he could not attend the deliberation or present additional argument.88
The district court and Wyoming Supreme Court summarily dismissed any due
process violation.89 The district court and the Wyoming Supreme Court instead
treated Decker’s second issue as a claimed violation of the PMA.90
With little discussion, the district court afﬁrmed, stating the PMA was
not violated because the Panel’s deliberations were not a “meeting” under the
PMA.91 The Wyoming Supreme Court noted a PMA violation would void the
Panel’s decision, thereby making the issue dispositive.92 While the court was split

82

Decker Motion, supra note 5, at 500–01.

83

Id.

84

Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 526–36.

85

Id. at 529. The Commission made this general conclusion prior to discussing the PMA
speciﬁcally. Id. The Commission seemed to rely on the WAPA in making this conclusion. See id.
86
Id. at 530–32. The Commission also stated in the alternative, if the Panel’s deliberations
were subject to the PMA, an executive session would be allowed. Id. at 533.
87

Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker II), 191 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2008).

88

Id.

89

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 119; Decker II Appellant’s Brief, supra note 5, app. E at 12. The
Wyoming Supreme Court stated the Commission’s denial of Decker’s motion raised no due process
concerns because he already had a full opportunity to present and argue his case and was trying to
get a second chance that was not required by law. Decker II, 191 P.3d at 119.
90

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 113; Decker II Appellant’s Brief, supra note 5, app. E at 12.

91

Decker II Appellant’s Brief, supra note 5, app. E at 12.

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 113; see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-403 (2009). The issue would have
been dispositive because a void decision would mean the court had nothing to review. Decker II, 191
P.3d at 113.
92
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regarding the PMA violation, it ultimately reversed the denial of Decker’s beneﬁts
because substantial evidence did not support the Panel’s decision.93

Majority Opinion
After reviewing the PMA and statutes relating to the Commission, the majority
stated many reasons supported a conclusion that open deliberations by the Panel
were not required.94 The court’s main rationale was the Panel is not an “agency”
as deﬁned by the PMA.95 The court reasoned the Panel is not a permanent body
created by the legislature, but instead a “transitory body,” existing solely under
the control of the Commission.96 The court also provided alternative reasons for
why the PMA did not apply to the Panel: (1) it is not a “governing body,” (2)
its quasi-judicial hearing is not a “meeting,” and (3) decisions by the Panel are
not “action.”97 Finally, the court looked to workers’ compensation statutes and
stated it would make “no sense” to require the Panel to deliberate in a short open
meeting because the Panel is allowed forty-ﬁve days to deliberate.98

Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued the Panel violated the PMA by deliberating behind closed
doors.99 The dissent ﬁrst addressed whether the Panel is an “agency,” concluding
it ﬁts within the deﬁnition because the legislature granted it authority to decide all
issues in the case.100 The dissent further argued that if the Panel is not an agency
under the PMA, then it would not be an agency under the WAPA; and this would
eliminate the court’s basis for judicial review.101 The dissent said this made the

93

Id. at 108. Justice Golden authored the majority opinion, which Justice Hill and District
Judge Norman E. Young joined. Id. Judge Young was sitting for Justice Burke who recused himself.
Justice Kite authored the dissent, which Chief Justice Voigt joined. Id. at 122 (Kite, J., dissenting).
The dissent would not have reached the substantial evidence issue, and it was never discussed
whether the dissent agreed with that portion or not. See id. at 122–25.
94

Id. at 118 (majority opinion). Justice Golden authored the majority opinion, which was
joined by Justice Hill and District Judge Young. Id. at 106.
95

Id. at 118.

96

Id. at 118–19 (“[T]he legislature has provided for [the Panel’s] potential existence, but their
actual existence is governed solely by the Medical Commission.”). The PMA requires the agency to
be “created by or pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution, statute or ordinance.” WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-4-402(a)(ii) (2009).
97

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 119. The court provided no reasoning for these conclusions. See id.

Id. (referring to WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-602(b)(ii) (2007), which provides that the panel
shall issue a decision within 45 days after the case’s record is closed).
98

99
100

Id. at 122 (Kite, J., dissenting). Justice Kite was joined by Chief Justice Voigt. Id. at 122.
See id. at 123.

101

Id. at 123–24. The dissent cited Wyoming Statute § 16-3-114(a) which is the provision
allowing for judicial review of agency action. Id.; see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-114 (2009).
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majority’s opinion “internally inconsistent” because the court reviewed the Panel’s
decision even though it found it was not an agency.102
Next, the dissent had to determine if the Panel constituted a “quorum of
the governing body,” which required interpretation of “quorum.”103 The dissent
accepted that the Medical Commission was the governing body and concluded
a quorum exists when there are a sufﬁcient number of members present to
transact the body’s business.104 Since three members of the Medical Commission
are authorized to make ﬁnal decisions, the dissent concluded the three-member
panels constituted a “quorum.”105 Finally, the dissent dismissed the Commission’s
argument that Panel deliberations could be closed under the executive session
exception because conﬁdential information is discussed.106 The dissent stated no
exception would apply since information disclosed in a hearing is not conﬁdential
because the plaintiff waives his or her privilege when a claim is brought.107

ANALYSIS
In Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker II), the Wyoming
Supreme Court relied on alternative rationales for ﬁnding there was no violation
of the PMA: (1) the Panel was not a public body subject to the PMA, and, in the
alternative, (2) the Panel’s deliberations were not covered by the PMA.108 This
section begins by setting forth the basic framework for determining if a public
body has violated the PMA.109 Next, this analysis discusses why the court’s ﬁrst
rationale is incorrect, and concludes the Panel is a body subject to the act.110
Furthermore, this analysis discusses why the court’s second rationale supports
its decision, and concludes quasi-judicial deliberations are not covered by the
PMA.111 Finally, this analysis will examine the subject matter of quasi-judicial
deliberations and argue that policy favors the court’s second rationale.112

102

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 123 (Kite, J., dissenting).

103

Id. at 124.

104

Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1868 (1993)).

105

Id. The court used the following syllogism: (1) issuing ﬁnal decisions is the business of the
Commission, (2) a hearing panel is authorized to issue ﬁnal decisions, so (3) therefore the hearing
panel is a quorum of the governing body. Id.
106

Id. at 124–25.

107

Id. at 125. The dissent also stated even if an executive session was allowed, the proper
procedures were not followed. Id.; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-405(b)–(c) (2009).
108

Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm’n (Decker II), 191 P.3d 105, 118–19 (Wyo. 2008).

109

See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.

110

See infra notes 120–46 and accompanying text.

111

See infra notes 147–74 and accompanying text.

112

See infra notes 175–94 and accompanying text.
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Framework of Analysis in PMA Cases
The PMA does not list with speciﬁcity all the bodies subject to its provisions;
instead, its scope is determined by whether the body in question ﬁts within the
deﬁnitions provided.113 Therefore, the question of whether a particular body is
subject to the PMA is one of statutory interpretation.114 In order for a party to
successfully allege a body violated the PMA, the alleged body must: (1) be an
“agency,” (2) have held a “meeting,” requiring a quorum of the governing body to
be present, and (3) have undertaken “action” in a closed meeting not authorized
under executive session privileges.115 Courts often analyze open meeting violations
in two stages.116 First, courts determine whether the alleged body is subject to the
act—in Wyoming this would require the body be an “agency” and a “quorum
of the governing body.”117 Second, courts determine whether the act covers the
subject matter of the meeting.118 While the court in Decker II found the Panel
did not satisfy any of the requirements, it primarily relied on the ﬁrst stage of
analysis.119

Determining if the Hearing Panel is a Body Subject to the PMA
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s main theory was that the Panel was not
subject to the PMA because it was not an “agency” to which the act applied.120
The court also held the Panel was not a “governing body” and therefore could not
hold meetings.121 Disagreement with these arguments formed the basis for the
dissent.122 The dissent correctly decided this ﬁrst stage of the analysis, because the
Panel is an “agency” and a “quorum of the governing body.”123

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402 (2009). A majority of open meeting laws deﬁne “agency” in
broad terms. Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, What Constitutes an Agency Subject to Application of
State Freedom of Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4TH 742 (2009).
113

114

See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118.

115

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-402, 403, 405 (2009).

116

Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1168–70 (describing how open meeting laws must ﬁrst apply to
particular bodies and then how the laws govern certain actions); Margaret S. DeWind, Note, The
Wisconsin Supreme Court Lets the Sun Shine in: State v. Showers and the Wisconsin Open Meeting
Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 827, 837–38 (describing qualitative and quantitative prongs in determining
whether there is a meeting under the Wisconsin open meeting law).
117

Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1168–70; DeWind, supra note 116, at 837–38.

118

Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1168–70; DeWind, supra note 116, at 837–38.

119

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118–19. The following two sections will discuss why the court
should have relied more on the second stage. See infra notes 120–94 and accompanying text.
120

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118.

121

Id. at 119.

122

Id. at 122–25 (Kite, J., dissenting).

123

See infra notes 124–46 and accompanying text.
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Agency Deﬁnition
Since the PMA and WAPA deﬁne “agency” similarly, the court has limited
ability to determine the hearing panel is not an agency.124 A ﬁnding that the
hearing panel is not an agency under the WAPA eliminates the court’s basis for
judicial review.125 The WAPA’s deﬁnition of “agency” is narrower than the PMA’s
because it does not include “committee” or “subagency.”126 Therefore when a
body is an agency under the WAPA—like the Panel—it must also be an agency
under the PMA.127 The Commission suggested the PMA did not apply to the
hearing panel because it was quasi-judicial and therefore fell under the judiciary
exemption.128 However, the WAPA’s deﬁnition of “agency” also exempts the
judiciary, and therefore the dissent’s argument that there would be no basis for
judicial review would also apply to the Commission’s reasoning.129
Even if the WAPA did not pose a problem, the court’s interpretation of
the statute was incorrect because the hearing panel is an “agency” as the PMA
deﬁnes the term.130 The court focused on whether a hearing panel is “created
by or pursuant to” a state statute.131 The court determined the Panel is not
created by the legislature, distinguishing between providing for the existence
of the hearing panel and actually creating the hearing panel.132 There are two
124
Decker II, 191 P.3d at 123–24 (Kite, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s opinion
as “internally inconsistent” because it reviews the Panel’s action even though it ﬁnds it is not an
agency). Agency is deﬁned under the PMA at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402(a)(ii). Agency is deﬁned
under the WAPA at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-101(b)(i) (2009).

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 124 (Kite, J., dissenting); see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-114(a) (2009)
(“[A]ny person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a ﬁnal decision of an agency in a contested
case . . . is entitled to judicial review . . . .”).
125

Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402(a)(ii), with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-101(b)(i).
According to the PMA, “agency” means “any authority, bureau, board, commission, committee,
or subagency of the state . . . which is created by or pursuant to . . . statute.” WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-4-402(a)(ii). The WAPA does not include “committee” or “subagency” in its deﬁnition and
adds “department, division, ofﬁcer or employee of the state.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-101(b)(i).
126

127
Decker II, 191 P.3d at 124 (Kite, J., dissenting). The dissent did not determine speciﬁcally
what type of body the hearing panel was, but stated “there is simply no question that it is an
‘authority, bureau, board, commission, committee, or subagency of the state.’” Id. at 123.

Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 533. See generally WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402(a)
(ii) (stating that the deﬁnition of agency does not include the judiciary). The Commission’s
rationale is similar to the approach some state courts have taken when considering if quasi-judicial
deliberations are subject to open meeting laws. See, e.g., Roberts II v. City of Cranston Zoning Bd.
of Review, 448 A.2d 779, 780–81 (R.I. 1982); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (citing
and discussing states that ﬁnd quasi-judicial bodies are similar to the judiciary for the purposes of
open meeting laws).
128

129

See WYO. STAT. ANN. §16-3-101(b)(i); Decker II, 191 P.3d at 124 (Kite, J., dissenting).

130

See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 124.

131

Id. at 118 (majority opinion); see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402(a)(ii).

132

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118.
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problems with the court’s rationale.133 First, this interpretation ignores the plain
meaning of the statute because it does not consider the meaning of “pursuant
to” as used in the statute.134 While each individual hearing panel is not created
by statute, the Commission creates the Panels pursuant to statute.135 Second, a
public body cannot avoid open meeting laws by delegating power to a committee
or subagency.136 Under the majority’s interpretation, the PMA is circumvented
anytime the Wyoming Legislature passes a statute that gives bodies the power to
create additional bodies; because these additional bodies are only “potential.”137

Quorum of the Governing Body Deﬁnition
In order for there to be a “meeting” under the PMA, a quorum of the
governing body is required.138 Both the Wyoming Supreme Court and Medical
Commission determined the hearing panel was not a “quorum of the governing
body.”139 The court and commission reached this conclusion by reasoning the
governing body was the Medical Commission, and not the hearing panel.140
While the term “governing body” is not deﬁned in the PMA, the court could
have turned to Black’s Law Dictionary, which deﬁnes it as “a group of ofﬁcers or
persons having ultimate control.”141 This deﬁnition is consistent with how other
133

See infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.

134

Hede v. Gilstrap, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 2005) (stating the principles of statutory
construction).
135
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-616 (2009). One of the duties of the Commission is furnish
three of its members to serve as a hearing panel. § 27-14-616(b)(iv). The Commission has no
control over who the members of the Panel are, because all members are appointed by the governor.
§ 27-14-616(a). Further, the legislature has recognized in another statute the hearing panel is created
“pursuant to statute.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-602(b)(ii) (2009) (“If the contested case is heard by
the hearing panel created pursuant to [§] 27-14-616(b)(iv), the panel shall render a decision within
forty-ﬁve (45) days after the close of the record . . . .”).
136

Jersawitz v. Fortson, 446 S.E.2d 206, 208 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding a committee that
“acted as a vehicle” of the Atlanta Housing Authority had to comply with the open meeting law and
the housing authority could not “hide behind the committee”); see SCHWING, supra note 16, at 51.
Further, many open meeting laws, including Wyoming’s, explicitly cover subagencies. E.g., IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 67-2341(4)(d) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.020(1)(c) (West 2009); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402(a)(ii).
137

See Wheeling Corp. v. Columbus & Ohio River R.R. Co., 771 N.E.2d 263, 272 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2001) (stating the fact a committee is established informally is immaterial, otherwise public
bodies could always informally establish committees to avoid the open meeting law).
138
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402. Prior to 1995 this was not a requirement. 1995 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 208.
139

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 119; Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 532–33.

140

Decker II, 191 P.3d at 119; Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 532–33. Since the
Commission contains at least eleven members, a three-member hearing panel would not be a
quorum. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1370 (9th ed. 2009) (deﬁning “quorum” as “[t]he minimum
number of members (usu[ally] a majority of all the members) who must be present for a deliberative
assembly to legally transact business”).
141

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 764 (9th ed. 2009).
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open meeting statutes deﬁne governing body because it focuses on the control and
authority of the body.142 The hearing panel is authorized to make ﬁnal decisions
for the Medical Commission regarding the resolution of contested case hearings
involving medically contested cases, and therefore is a governing body.143 The
majority’s reasoning should only apply if the body has no authority to make ﬁnal
decisions and exists solely as an advisory board.144 In determining if open meeting
laws apply to subordinate bodies, there is a distinction between those bodies that
exercise actual decision-making power and those that are purely advisory.145 The
dissent was therefore correct to focus on the authority granted to the hearing
panel when determining it was a “quorum of the governing body.”146

Determining if the Panel’s Deliberations are Covered by the PMA
Once a court determines a body is subject to the PMA, it must then examine
the subject matter of the meeting to determine if it ﬁts within the deﬁnition of
“meeting.”147 Neither the majority nor the dissent discussed this aspect of the
analysis in any depth.148 However, the Commission relied heavily on this topic
when denying Decker’s motion.149 This part of the analysis provides the strongest
support for the court’s decision.150

Terms Deﬁned
The PMA’s deﬁnition of “meeting” requires that it be called “for the purpose
of discussion, deliberation, presentation of information or taking action regarding
public business.”151 Prior to 1995, the PMA did not cover deliberations or
142
E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (2009) (‘“[G]overnmental body’ means an assembly,
council, board, commission, committee, or other similar body of a public entity with the authority
to establish policies or make decisions for the public entity or with the authority to advise or make
recommendations to the public entity . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-2341(5) (2009) (‘“Governing
body’ means the members of any public agency which consists of two (2) or more members, with
the authority to make decisions for or recommendations to a public agency regarding any matter.”).
143
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-616(b)(iv) (stating that when hearing a contested case, the
hearing panel “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to make the ﬁnal administrative determination of the
validity and amount of compensation payable”).
144
See SCHWING, supra note 16, at 94–96 (discussing open meeting laws which apply only
to “governing” bodies compared to those that cover advisory committees); Pupillo, supra note 18,
at 1169 (stating that open meeting statutes typically exempt those boards and committees which
perform an advisory role).
145

SCHWING, supra note 16, at 97–98.

146

See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 124 (Kite, J., dissenting).

147

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402.

148

See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118–19; id. at 122–25 (Kite, J., dissenting).

149

Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 526–36.

150

See infra notes 151–94 and accompanying text.

151

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-402(a)(iii).
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discussions of a public body and instead only required open meetings when a
body took “action.”152 Like Wyoming, other states amended open meeting laws
to include deliberations because they believed citizens required knowledge about
more than the ﬁnal decision.153 Deliberation is not deﬁned in the PMA, though
other states do deﬁne the term.154 Public business is not deﬁned in the PMA, but
the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated the term is broad and would encompass
how a public agency operates and functions.155 The court has also said any business
of a state agency is public business.156

Types of Deliberations Covered
Determining which deliberations are exempt from coverage of the PMA
involves a balancing of interests.157 On one side is the interest of the public in
being informed.158 On the other side is the interest of the body in maintaining
privacy and conﬁdentiality.159 In the context of quasi-judicial deliberations, some
courts and commentators argue an agency’s interest in conﬁdentiality outweighs
the public’s interest and therefore conclude quasi-judicial deliberations should not
be subject to open meeting laws.160

152
1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 208. The previous deﬁnition of meeting stated: “‘Meeting’ means an
assembly of the governing body of an agency at which action is taken.” Id. While some state open
meeting statutes covered deliberations from the beginning, others only covered action. SCHWING,
supra note 16, at 284. Wyoming was the last state to cover deliberations. Id. While the deﬁnition of
“meeting” changed to add deliberation, the PMA still only states “action” taken in a closed meeting
is void. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-403.
153
SCHWING, supra note 16, at 275 (“Simple knowledge of the ﬁnal action or the vote is often
only the unsatisfactory end of the story—the butler did it—without the deliberations and analysis
leading up to the denouement.”).

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-25A-2 (2009) (deﬁning deliberation as “[a]n exchange of
information or ideas among a quorum of members of a governmental body intended to arrive at
or inﬂuence a decision as to how the members of the governmental body should vote on a speciﬁc
matter”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11A (West 2009) (deﬁning deliberation as “a verbal
exchange between a quorum of members of a governmental body attempting to arrive at a decision
on any public business within its jurisdiction”).
154

155

Shaefer v. State ex rel. Univ. of Wyo., 139 P.3d 468, 472 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Fincher v.
State, 497 S.E.2d 632, 636 (Ga. App. 1998)).
156

Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 791 (Wyo. 1983).

157

See The Press Fights, supra note 16, at 1206 (stating the “most important exemptions” to
open meeting laws exist because the interests served by maintaining secrecy are more important than
informing the public).
158

Id.

159

Id.

160

See, e.g., Kennedy v. Upper Milford Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d 1104, 1115–16
(Pa. 2003); Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 598 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah
1979); William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples
as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 189–90 (2009) (recognizing the interest an agency has
in conﬁdentiality and stating it is necessary to collegial decision making).
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The purpose of the PMA supports not requiring all types of deliberations
to be within the scope of the PMA.161 The legislature expressed its intent by
declaring, “[A]gencies of Wyoming exist to conduct public business. Certain
deliberations and actions shall be taken openly as provided in this act.”162 Neither
the majority nor the dissent discussed the PMA’s statement of purpose adopted
by the legislature.163 Since every word in a statute must have meaning, when the
legislature used “certain” it must have meant the PMA would not apply to all
types of deliberations.164
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s application of the PMA also suggests there are
types of deliberations not covered by the act.165 In a case after the legislature added
deliberations to the deﬁnition of meeting, the court continued to follow cases
which allow bodies to hold “informal meetings” prior to making a decision.166
The reasoning accepted in those cases is similar to a case considered prior to the
adoption of the PMA, where the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized public
bodies—including quasi-judicial agencies—should be allowed to conduct some
deliberations in private.167 While the legislature has adopted and amended the
PMA since then, the underlying policy has not changed because the rationale is
similar to recent cases decided by the court.168

Business of Quasi-Judicial Deliberations
The district court found the hearing panel’s deliberations were “not a matter
of public business,” and therefore no “meeting” was held.169 The business before
the Panel, and other quasi-judicial bodies, primarily involves an individual or
161

See infra notes 162–68 and accompanying text. As the court noted in Decker II, the primary
focus when interpreting statutes is the legislature’s intent. 191 P.3d. at 118.
162

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-401 (2009) (emphasis added).

163

See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118–19; id. at 122–25 (Kite, J., dissenting).

164

See id. at 118 (majority opinion); Hede v. Gilstrap, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 2005) (“Each
word of a statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered superﬂuous . . . .”); Coal. for
Quality Health Care v. N.J. Dept. of Banking, 791 A.2d 1085, 1103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002) (interpreting “certain” in a statute to mean “not all”); Brief of Appellee at 36, Decker II, 191
P.3d 105 (S-07-0051) (emphasizing the legislature’s use of “certain”).
165
See Mayland v. Flitner, 28 P.3d 838, 849 (2001); Ward v. Bd. of Trs. of Goshen County
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 622 (Wyo. 1993); Emery v. City of Rawlins, 596 P.2d 675, 680
(Wyo. 1979).
166

Mayland, 28 P.3d at 849.

167

See Sch. Dist. No. 9 v. Dist. Boundary Bd., 351 P.2d 106, 110 (Wyo. 1960); see also supra
notes 40–43 and accompanying text (explaining facts and holding of Sch. Dist. No. 9).
168

See Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 533.

169

Decker II Appellant’s Brief, supra note 5, app. E at 12. The Wyoming Supreme Court
and commission also summarily determined there was no “meeting,” though neither provided a
rationale similar to the district court’s. See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 118–19; Commission’s Decision,
supra note 6, at 526–36.
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small group of individuals.170 It is true quasi-judicial bodies sometimes conduct
business that relates to the general public when they issue decisions.171 However,
this type of public business is distinguishable from what the PMA covers because
opening quasi-judicial deliberations to the public does not satisfy the policy and
purpose of the act.172 One of the main purposes of open meeting laws is to hold
government bodies and ofﬁcials accountable.173 However, this purpose conﬂicts
with the purposes of a quasi-judicial body deciding a contested case because it
must act independently and be fair—to do this requires the decision-makers to be
free from criticism.174

Implications of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s Decision
A holding that quasi-judicial deliberations are not within the scope of the
PMA’s deﬁnition of “meeting” would be similar to the approach taken by Utah and
Ohio courts.175 The approach would also be consistent with a Wyoming district
court’s interpretation of the Wyoming Public Records Act—construing the act to
include a deliberative-process privilege.176 Since the court in Decker II relied on
alternative rationales, it is not entirely clear whether Wyoming will continue to
follow this approach with regard to all quasi-judicial bodies.177 However, the court

170
See AFSCME v. Dept. of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., 681 N.E.2d 998, 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997);
KOCH, supra note 44, § 2.11 (“In general, adjudication is the decision making process for applying
preexisting standards to individual circumstances.”).
171
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947); KOCH, supra note 44, § 2.11
(“[P]olicy articulation is often a necessary part of adjudication.”).
172
See Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1315; Christopher B. McNeil, The Public’s Right of
Access to “Some Kind of Hearing”: Creating Policies that Protect the Right to Observe Agency Hearings,
68 LA. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2008).
173

See The Press Fights, supra note 16, at 1201; Pupillo, supra note 18, at 1166.

174

See Carolyn M. Van Noy, Comment, The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A Conﬂict in
Values, 61 WASH. L. REV. 533, 556 (1986) (explaining that public ofﬁcials face a conﬂict in values
when they act as decision makers). This would be especially true at local government levels, for
example the county commissioners. See id.
175
See Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1315–16; Angerman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio,
591 N.E.2d 3, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
176
Decision Letter at 1–7, Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Freudenthal (Cheyenne Newspapers
PRA Case), Docket No. 173-978 (Laramie County Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2009).
177

See Cheyenne Newspapers PMA Case Appellant’s Brief, supra note 29, at 14–28 (arguing
quasi-judicial bodies must deliberate in the open following contested case hearings). The plaintiffs
in Cheyenne Newspapers PMA Case claimed the Cheyenne Board of Appeals violated the PMA by
deliberating in private. Id. at 5. The Board of Appeals held a contested case hearing to review the
denial of demolition permits by Cheyenne’s Historic Preservation Board. Cheyenne Newspapers PMA
Case Appellee’s Brief, supra note 63, at 2. After the hearing the board deliberated the case in private
and later adopted a written decision in an open meeting. Id. The district court held the PMA did
not apply to quasi-judicial deliberations following contested case hearings. Id. at 11. But see Editor’s
note supra p. 203.
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should continue to hold quasi-judicial deliberations are not subject to the PMA
because of strong policy considerations.178
When discussing these policy concerns, most courts recognize privacy
is necessary to ensure an effective decision-making process in quasi-judicial
deliberations.179 Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
recognize the importance of keeping a court’s decision-making process closed.180
There is no right of the public, or parties, to witness jury deliberations.181 This
should apply equally to administrative adjudications.182
As one court recognized, it is “unnatural” to think members of an agency
will not deliberate about the case in private.183 An agency member will frequently
use his mind and think about the case, whether in the privacy of his home or at
the ofﬁce.184 In the context of the hearing panel, it would effectively mean that
even two members of the panel could not talk to each other about any matter
of the case outside of a public meeting.185 Since the agency can deliberate for
several days, the agency would either have to condense deliberations into one
open meeting, or hold multiple open meetings anytime the PMA applied.186 The
body’s written decision, which contains ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law, is
sufﬁcient to show the deliberative process of the quasi-judicial body.187

178

See infra notes 179–94 and accompanying text.

179

See Canney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 278 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 1973) (Dekle, J.,
dissenting) (stating that if an administrative body is deprived of “free deliberation” it will prohibit
open discussion which is necessary to reach a “fair and just result”); Kennedy, 834 A.2d 1104,
1115 (Pa. 2003) (describing how public deliberations are incompatible with the decision-making
process).
180

E.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (stating because the mental
processes of judges cannot be scrutinized, it follows that the Secretary of Agriculture’s decisionmaking process should not be scrutinized); Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1115–17; Commonwealth v.
Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258, 1263–64 (Pa. 1999); Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1315.
181

See The Press Fights, supra note 16, at 1206.

182

See McNeil, supra note 172, at 1128 (discussing how the “mental processes” of judges,
including administrative adjudicators, should be kept private).
183

Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1315.

184

Id.

Two members would be a quorum, therefore requiring an open meeting. See WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 16-4-402; supra note 140 and accompanying text.
185

186

See Decker II, 191 P.3d at 119.

187

See Canney, 278 So. 2d at 265 (Dekle, J., dissenting) (“The basic concept of the ‘right
of the public to know’ is fulﬁlled upon reaching such a fair and just result which is then publicly
conveyed.”); Stockmeier v. Nev. Dept. of Corrs. Psychological Review Panel, 135 P.3d 220, 224
(Nev. 2006) (stating the ability to appeal the decision holds the public body accountable); Kennedy,
834 A.2d at 1115; SCHWING, supra note 16, at 348–49; Funk, supra note 160, at 191.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/9

22

Hesser: Administrative Law - Deliberating in the Open: Applying Wyoming's

CASE NOTE

2010

225

Furthermore, requiring agencies to hold deliberations of contested case
hearings in the open would have many negative implications.188 The Commission
noted in its decision that the “practical effect” of requiring deliberations to be open
would cause “chaos” among the agencies in Wyoming that conduct contested
case proceedings.189 One reason for chaos would be that decisions reached by any
quasi-judicial agency that has not conducted its deliberations in the open would be
void if challenged by a party.190 Another form of chaos will result from the delicate
types of discussions adjudicators must have when deciding cases.191 For example,
a Pennsylvania court noted that case decisions frequently rely on the credibility of
witnesses and the weight an agency puts on a witness’s testimony, and therefore
such discussions evaluating witness testimony should be held privately.192 Another
problem would be created because members of the hearing panel cannot engage
in ex parte communication, which would result if only one party showed up to
the deliberations.193 Finally, chaos may also result because quasi-judicial bodies
subject to the PMA could try to avoid its requirements by appointing a single
hearing ofﬁcer to decide the case.194

CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Decker II relied on alternative
rationales.195 First, the court concluded the hearing panel formed by the Medical

188

See Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 535.

189

Id.

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-403(a) (“Action taken at a meeting not in conformity with this
act is null and void and not merely voidable.”); Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 535 (“Such
would also have the effect of undermining all past decisions in all contested case proceedings before
virtually all agencies.”). The PMA does not provide a statute of limitations. See WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-4-401 to -408 (2009). After an action is voided by the court, the body is usually required to
start its procedure from the beginning, this time complying with the law. See SCHWING, supra note
16, at 516–17 (discussing how various states address the effect of a void action). Wyoming has not
considered how a void act can be cured, because it has never found a violation of the act. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
190

191

Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1115–17. In the context of medically contested cases, the hearing
panel would be discussing whether doctors are credible. See Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med.
Comm’n (Decker I), 124 P.3d 686, 697 (Wyo. 2005) (“As with any hearing examiner, the
Commission is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses.”).
192

Kennedy, 834 A.2d at 1115–17.

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-111 (2009); Commission’s Decision, supra note 6, at 528; see
also WYO. EXEC. ORDER NO. 1981-12 (1981) (requiring agencies “to guard against ex parte contacts
and biased decision making”). When the quasi-judicial body begins deliberations the case would
be closed, so a party may not show up because it could not advocate its position any longer. See
025-240-009 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (Weil 2008).
193

194
See SCHWING, supra note 16, at 99–100 (concluding that most states ﬁnd one individual
does not constitute a public body).
195

See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

23

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 1, Art. 9

226

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

Commission was not a body subject to the PMA.196 However, this rationale was
incorrect because the panel is an “agency” as deﬁned by the PMA.197 Second, the
court concluded the deliberations of the hearing panel were not subject to the
PMA.198 This rationale provides the strongest support for the court’s decision.199
Reliance on both rationales creates uncertainty about whether quasi-judicial
deliberations are subject to the PMA—making it unclear if other agencies in the
state which preside over contested case hearings must hold their deliberations
in the open.200 The PMA does not directly answer the question, and, like many
other states, it is left to the court’s interpretation, absent legislation.201 The court
should continue to hold that quasi-judicial deliberations are not subject to the
PMA because the conclusion is supported by the purpose of the act and policy
arguments.202 Without such a holding, chaos could be created among the many
state agencies that preside over contested cases.203

196

See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.

197

See supra notes 120–46 and accompanying text.

198

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

199

See supra notes 147–74 and accompanying text.

200

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.

201

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

202

See supra notes 175–87 and accompanying text.

203

See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
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